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ABSTRACT
Egyptian religious freedom activists and researchers have for decades called for more
secularism to remedy the violations facing religious minorities. Those religious minorities
have been subject to attacks for practicing religious rituals and suffered from lack of
recognition by the government. As those activists advocated secularism, some academics
critiqued it and deemed it the instigator of the very problems it claims to uproot. Saba
Mahmood famously argued that secularism is a primary producer of religious tension in
Egypt. In this thesis, I argue that it is not the mere regulation of religious difference as a
feature of secularism that is the problem, but the manner in which Egypt does the
regulation, in which it empowers religious institutions and espouses Islam as its
quintessential identity and Shari'a the basis of its public order. I also conclude that despite
secularism’s inherent problems, it continues to hold promise for some change for Egypt’s
minorities. I reach that conclusion by testing Mahmood’s argument against key legal events
post-2013: The 2014 Constitution, the Church Construction Law, and the yet to be issued
Personal Status Law for non-Muslims.

KEY WORDS: Religious freedom, secularism, Personal Status Law, Talal Asad, Saba
Mahmood, Civil State, Constitution, Religious Tension, sectarianism, Church-State relations,
Shari'a
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I. Introduction
In an ideal world, Egyptian Muslims and Christians can convert to either religion without
consequence.1 Churches are built and demolished without stirring tensions on either side.2 And
interfaith romance does not end in army tanks protecting the local church.3 The perennial
sectarian tensions are not the only venue where religion features prominently in Egypt. In Egypt,
the place of religion is the question. Islamists helped bring down Mubarak so that their
understanding of Shari’’a reigns. Two years later, “the people,” together with the army, brought
Morsi down so that it does not. Where religion features in the Egyptian identity, and government,
is so potent, that it was literally the driver (enabler of) behind two tumultuous and violent
transfers of power, followed by painful transitions. Relying on the animations of the question of
religion is the status of religious minorities, most prominent among them is the Middle East’s
largest religious minority, Coptic Christians.
Advocating for the inclusion and the equality of the 15-million-member community, secular - or
civil - forces have called for more secularization, albeit under different names. They advocated
for religious liberty, for a civil state standing at an equal distance from all religions, and for
religious laws that are discriminatory to minorities or women to be repealed. Nonetheless,
critical of their approach, Saba Mahmood insinuates that those activists are unaware of colonial
underpinnings of the concept, and attacks it outright as an instigator of sectarianism, not a
solution.4 In this paper, I respond to Mahmood’s critique by testing her thesis against key legal
events in Egypt post-2013. I argue that it is not the secular regulation of religious difference that
is the producer of tensions, but rather the manner in which the state empowers religious
institutions and espouses Islam as its quintessential identity and Shari'a the basis of its public

1

Emir Nader, Imprisoned journalist beaten in prison for conversion to Christianity, Daily News Egypt (2015),
https://dailynewsegypt.com/2015/05/13/imprisoned-journalist-beaten-in-prison-for-conversion-to-christianity/ (last
visited Dec 7, 2020).
2
Ishak Ibrahim, The Reality of Church Construction in Egypt, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (2019),
https://eipr.org/en/blog/ishak-ibrahim/2019/07/reality-church-construction-egypt (last visited Dec 7, 2020).
3
Shawki Abdel Qader et al., The “Abeer” Strife Burns the Churches of Imbaba and Threatens to Burn the Country,
Al-Youm Al-Sabe’ (2011), https://www.youm7.com/story/2011/5/12/-بحرق-وتهدد-إمبابة-كنائس-تحرق-»«عبير-فتنة
البلد/410779 (last visited Dec 7, 2020).
4
SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE: A MINORITY REPORT (2015).
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order. I ultimately conclude that despite that and despite secularism's inherent problems, it still
holds promise for positive change for Egypt’s religious minorities.
The first section of this thesis offers a theoretical background on secularism and the classic and
contemporary debates on it. It holds the author’s main critique of Mahmood’s take on Egyptian
secularism. The second looks at the concept of the “Civil State” and its development in Egypt.
The term is examined in its usage as an alternative to secularism, where it largely connotes a
secular order that respects religion. The third looks into the promotion of “religious liberty,” as a
constitutive component of secularism. Those terms have substituted secularism discursively, and
have had lives of their own. Having given an overview of what secularism is, Mahmood’s
critique of it in the Egyptian context, and how the pertinent aspects of secularism fared in Egypt,
the thesis concludes with a section that tests Mahmood’s arguments against specific key legal
events post-2013. Those events are the 2014 Constitution and its drafting process, the Church
Construction Law of 2016 and the Personal Status Law for non-Muslims.5

5

This thesis focuses on the tensions at play in the context of Egypt’s authoritarian “secular” regime, which has been
the status quo since the fifties. It does not discuss the short-lived reign of the Muslim Brotherhood, nor entertain the
possibility of future elections that would bring another Islamist group to power. Similarly, this thesis is not
concerned with the perennial debate over Egypt’s identity being secular or religious, but rather how that identity
manifests itself in the concepts animating the place of religion in Egypt.

2

II. Secularism
This section surveys the overarching theoretical development of secularism, the debates
surrounding it and practical attempts at gauging its different implementations around the world.
It also addresses part of its history, competing perceptions of it, its Christian roots, and ends with
Mahmood’s critique and the author’s response to it. The objective of the introduction that
precedes Mahmood’s argument is to demonstrate the contrast between what she identifies as
secularism and its accepted articulations, to capture the nuance missing in her blanket criticism
of the term, and to expose her historicist approach to secularism.

A. Competing Definitions: Secularism, Secularity and Secularization
Secularism, secularity and secularization are all used in the discussion of the concept.
Distinguishing between the three is important from the onset. Each has its connotation, and its
most commonly used meaning, but in political rhetoric, they are often conflated. In his article,
The Secular and Secularisms, José Casanova disambiguates the difference between the contested
terms. He defines “the secular” as a modern category of a realm that is differentiated from “the
religious.”6 The term is contested, however, with many debates surrounding the extent of its
distinction from the religious, its legitimacy or autonomy. Casanova defines “secularization” as
the historical process which saw the differentiation between the secular and the religious,
primarily in Europe. Secularism, on the other hand, is basically the way secular worldviews or
ideologies are implemented. Casanova defines it as “a whole range of modern secular
worldviews and ideologies that may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated into
philosophies of history and normative-ideological state projects.”7 He elaborates that it takes the
form of a “cognitive differentiation between science, philosophy, and theology,” or “practical
differentiation between law, morality, and religion.”8 His definition entails that there are multiple
secularisms.

6

Jose Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 76 Social Research 1049 (2009).
Id.
8
Id.
7
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Casanova does not directly define secularity. However, he uses it to describe the manner in
which a certain secularism is “codified, institutionalized and experienced.”9 Therefore,
secularism is the practical manifestation of secular ideas, and secularity is the resultant
experience from said manifestation. Secularity is defined differently by other key philosophers.
Among them is Charles Taylor, whose classic, A Secular Age, is central to the modern debate on
secularism. In his book, Taylor offers three senses for secularity. The first is the emptying of
public spaces from God. To put it more concretely, Taylor explains that this means that a
member of society does not need to “encounter God” in his daily dealings or in the
administration of his affairs as part of said society. The second sense is the decline of religious
belief among members of society, evidenced by declining association with religion and church
attendance. And the third is “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and
indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and
frequently not the easiest to embrace.” He focuses on the third sense in his book, and addresses
belief and unbelief as life experiences and not as rival theories.10
Providing an alternative definition that focuses on the connotation of each term is Cole Durham.
Durham defines secularism as “an ideological position that is committed to promoting a secular
order as an end in itself.” He explains that this view would at least commit itself to removing
religion from the public sphere, and that “more militant versions” would be overtly anti-religion.
Secularity, on the other hand, in his view, is “an approach” that avoids identification with
religion, and instead offers a “neutral framework capable of accommodating or cooperating with
a broad range of religions and beliefs.” Clarifying his understanding of the terms, he states that
French laïcité has been historically closer to secularism, while American separationism to
secularity.11

9

Casanova, supra note 6.
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
11
Cole W. Durham, Religious Freedom in a Worldwide Setting: Comparative Reflection (2011),
https://classic.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Religious%20Freedom%20in%20a%20Worldwide%20Setting.pdf.
10
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B. The Secularization Thesis
The secularization thesis is central to the study of secularism, and is perhaps the origin of its
infamy in Egypt. The 1960s saw the emergence of the secularization thesis, which entailed
mainly three aspects: 1. The separation (or differentiation, which is the term Casanova uses) of
secular institutions from religious ones. 2. A decline in the role of religion in public life. And
finally, 3. A general decline in belief.12 The third aspect being the most contentious and at the
heart of the subsequent debate on secularism. The discourse entailed “cultural-evolutionary
understandings of secularism,” 13 which prophesied an inevitable demise of religion. Its
Eurocentric normative discourse invoked not only academic refutation in America and the nonWest, but also counter-secularist tendencies. The strongest challenge to the thesis came about in
the early 2000’s with 9/11 and the rise of religion worldwide. Twenty years later, with the
prevalence of religion, many of the former proponents of the secularization thesis abandoned it.14
Others, including Jose Casanova, found that parts of the thesis remained defensible. He
maintained that the differentiation of public and secular spheres continued to be viable, while the
inevitable decline of religious belief as an outcome of secularization is not. He argued that the
normative discourse on secularism in Europe was a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” and that European
secularism is the exception, and not the norm as initially theorized.15
Therefore, the common Egyptian perception that secularism is the public death of religion is in
reference to a debunked version of what the term was believed to mean. Its practical articulations
offer a wide range of experiences, where the place of religion varies greatly. Those differing
experiences have led to the presence of many secularisms.

12

Id.
Bhatia, Secularism and Secularisation: A Bibliographical Essay, 48 Econ. Polit. Wkly. 103 (2013),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24479051 (last visited Mar 5, 2021).
13
14

Id.

15

Jose Casanova, Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad, in POWERS OF THE SECULAR MODERN:
TALAL ASAD AND HIS INTERLOCUTORS 17 (2006),
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/secularization-revisited-a-reply-to-talal-asad.
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C. Capturing the Different Secularisms
Those secularisms, and the differences between them, fundamentally boil down to how the
different states regulate religion and religious difference. Speaking of the decisive role of the
state, Hussein Agrama writes:
The peculiar power of secularism cannot therefore be captured by a focus on the norms
that it imposes, as it resides in the questions that it obliges and in how the ambiguities of
state sovereignty and legal authority continue to animate them.16
In an attempt to “capture” how the different states - with the “ambiguities” of their sovereignty
and legal authority - “animate” the questions within which secularism “resides,” Durham
designed a spectrum encapsulating a variety of secularisms/secularities and their effects on
religious freedom. While the latter’s work is not specifically on secularism, it is particularly
relevant to this thesis, as it focuses on how secularism affects religious freedom. Addressing the
poignant role played by the sovereign state in its relationship with religion, Durham analyzed
state-religion configurations comparatively. His analysis focused on the degree of identification
of the different states with religion, and found that the degree of identification reflected on
religious freedom. He came up with a loop-shaped continuum that starts with positive
identification and ends with negative identification, both of which result in infringement of
religious freedom. At the tip of the loop lies what he describes as “non-identification.” It is at the
point of “non-identification,” that religious freedom is most respected. Speaking of the different
positions in his continuum, Durham highlights the fluidity of Church-State arrangements:
The various positions along this loop need to be understood as Weberian ideal types; no
state structure corresponds exactly with any of the described positions. Indeed, it is
probably best to think of the various positions along the loop as contested equilibrium
points reached in different societies at different times.17
He also argues that the diagram helps map current positions by states, and “also the range of
discourse arguing for alternative positions at a given time in a particular country.”18

16

Hussein Ali Agrama, Reflections on secularism, democracy, and politics in Egypt, 39 Am. Ethnol. 26–31 (2012),
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01342.x (last visited Dec 7, 2020).
17
Durham, supra note 11.
18
In his view, in the West today, the key source of infringement on religious freedom lies in states prioritizing their
neutrality over religious freedom, describing state neutrality and religious freedom as two competing key principles
of the secular state. Interestingly, in the dynamic that concerns this thesis, it is the state’s Islamic identity and
religious freedom that are competing principles.
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Durham’s work is unique for capturing this fluidity and relating it to religious freedom using
precise criteria, hence its relevance to this thesis. His work helps capture a gradation of what may
be branded secular, with a focus on the embedded criteria and their influence on the state of
religious freedom. This qualitative approach is especially lacking in the arguments put forward
by Mahmood, as will be discussed later in the paper.

D. Perceptions of Secularism and Secularization
While secularism, as experienced, is fluid and comes in many forms, perceptions of it have been
largely rigid. Those perceptions, from East and West, are so powerful that they are described to
possess “a degree of constitutive force.”19 They guide international relations, trigger local
conservatism, and/or performances of national identity conforming to or opposing those
passionately held perceptions.20 For instance, Wendy Brown finds that “Western secularism is so
relentlessly defined through its imagined opposite in Islamic theocracy.”21 The intensity - the
“constitutive force”- of that misperception is also alive and well in the Arab World, and
particularly Egypt, where secularism is anathema, that its fiercest proponents dare not mention it
by name. In the Egyptian collective imagination, secularism only exists in its most strict form,
where it is antagonistic to religion. This view is so deeply entrenched that secularism in popular
culture is synonymous with atheism. Perhaps among its more famous proponents is Farag Fouda,
who was assassinated in 1992 by Islamists for advocating for secularism. In his final book,
Dialogue on Secularism, he addressed that perception among Islamists, stating that secularism
for them is “an incoming demonic bud” and “an intruder atheist concept.”22 This narrative
continues to be common today.
The schism is not only between East and West. It is also deep across the Atlantic. In his classic,
Public Religions in the Modern World, José Casanova tries to reformulate the secularization

19

Agrama, supra note 16.
Agrama discusses how it guided the international community in its dealing with Egypt post-2011. The Arab
initially friendly, and later antagonistic stance towards secularism is one example.
21
Wendy Brown, Idealism, materialism, secularism?, SSRC The Immanent Frame,
https://tif.ssrc.org/2007/10/22/idealism-materialism-secularism/ (last visited Feb 14, 2021).
22
FARAG FOUDA, DIALOGUE ON SECULARISM (1986).
20
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thesis to reconcile the competing European and American takes on secularism. According to
him, the dominant narrative in Europe is that its secularization is “an empirically irrefutable fait
accompli,” and the majority of European sociologists continue to hold on to the secularization
thesis “unreflexively and uncritically.” The Americans, on the other side, reduce secularization
to its most vulnerable tenant, that is its projection of a decline in belief, and therefore dismiss it
as “myth.” His reformulation entailed maintaining the main aspects of the secularization thesis,
save for its prediction concerning a decline in belief among people. He finally concedes to
having failed to reconcile the two sides with his efforts.23

E. The Christian Roots of Secularism
Secularism’s Christian roots have been grounds for arguing for their incompatibility with the
Islamicate world. This line of argument, as pursued by Mahmood, falls into historicism, and
reduces the concept to its roots.24 Additionally, the dynamic between Christianity and secularism
has been a complex one. Christianity has both encouraged, and resisted, secularism. The degree
to which secularism’s origins are attributable to Christianity has been the subject of significant
debate. In his 1949 book, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications (better translated to
Presuppositions) of the Philosophy of History, Karl Löwith examined the work of key
philosophers on progress and secularism. He famously argued that “the modern idea of progress
is a transformation into a worldly form of Christian eschatology.”25 Critiquing his work was
Hans Blumenberg who challenged the assumption that a Christian concept could be
secularized.26 The Löwith-Blumenberg debate was central to the understanding of secularism at
the time.
More contemporary writers continued to animate the question. Casanova, for instance, argues
that the Christian roots of secularism are undeniable. In an article in response to Talal Asad, he

23

Casanova, supra note 15.
Lama Abu-Odeh, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: The Minority Report by Saba Mahmoud 148 (2016)
Book Review, Georget. Univ. Law Cent. (2017), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1951 (last visited
May 10, 2018).
25
According to Robert Wallace, Löwith explains that by eschatology he means: “as simply an orientation to the
future as the crucial ‘horizon’ for man, and hope as man’s attitude in relation to that horizon.”
26
Robert M. Wallace, Progress, Secularization and Modernity: The Löwith-Blumenberg Debate, New Ger. Crit.
63–79 (1981), https://www.jstor.org/stable/487864 (last visited Mar 5, 2021).
24
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cites the work of David Martin, who demonstrated that Christianity played a significant role in
the genealogy of secularization, both in the Latin-Catholic and the Anglo-Protestant cultural
areas. In the former, a “collision between religion and the differentiated secular spheres”
catalyzed the critique of religion and stirred “ample resonance” for it in Europe. This trend has
resulted in “the secularist genealogy of modernity [being] constructed as a triumphant
emancipation of reason, freedom, and worldly pursuits from the constraints of religion.” Moving
to the second cultural area, the Anglo-Protestant, and especially as it is experienced in the United
States, “there was collusion between religion and the secular differentiated spheres.” He moves
on to explain that while the Latin-Catholic variant saw religion inspire secularism in opposition
to it, the Anglo-Protestant religion actually advocated secularism. This is due to the presence of
multiple religious groups aspiring to equal treatment by the state and enjoying freedom from its
interference in the American experience. The first amendment’s dual clause, therefore, aimed at
protecting the federal government from religious entanglement, but equally also protecting
religious freedom, Casanova highlighted. He concluded that protestant Christianity especially “is
intrinsically implicated in the development of secular modernity.”27
While the Anglo-Protestant tradition was a supporter and instigator of the associated secular
human rights discourse, the Latin-Catholic tradition went through a different process. In this
process, the Catholic Church shifted positions from outright condemnation of secular human
rights as against the Church, to accepting, then endorsing the discourse. Casanova relays how
successive popes represented the steps towards the shift. The Papal position moved from one that
considered human rights and freedoms as “anathema and irreconcilable with the Catholic faith”
to finally accepting it in the 60’s after decades of rejection. The resistance to religious freedom
especially emanated from the implication that “true and false religions” are equal. After its shift
in position, the Catholic Church “consistently presented the protection of human rights as the
foundation of a just social and political global order.”28
The complexity of the history of Christianity and secularism demonstrates that it is reductionist
to deem the concept alien or incompatible with Muslim culture by referring to its roots as
27
28

Casanova, supra note 15.
Id.
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Christian. To describe its roots as Christian implies it cannot be divorced from its origins, and is
indefinitely tethered to them, while the relation between the two was more layered and complex.

F. Critique of Secularism
While the previous section highlights the main areas of contestation within secularism, this one
addresses Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood’s critique, with a focus on the latter. Asad provides the
foundation on which Mahmood builds her critique of secularism. Both Asad and Mahmood
address Egyptian secularism in specific. Asad lays the ground for the critique by examining the
history of modernization and secularization in colonial Egypt in his book, Formations of the
Secular, and Mahmood expounds on present-day Egyptian secularism in her book, Religious
Difference in a Secular Age.

1. Talal Asad on Egyptian Secularism
In his Foucauldian analysis of the secular and secularism, Asad famously critiques modernity in
its secularism and promises of religious freedom. He does that by offering genealogies of
religion and of the secular, that helped “deconstruct the secular self-understanding of modernity
that is constitutive of the social sciences.”29 His critique of liberalism and secularism uncovers,
“the coercion, silencing, and exclusion that inhere in the alleged universality of Western
traditions.”30 His work emerged in the wake of the post-9/11 War on Terror, when the West’s
secularism was contrasted with Middle Eastern religiosity, which from a Western perspective
inspired the terrorism that marked this era. In mainstream Western rhetoric, secularism was
portrayed as a solution to religion-inspired violence. His work challenged the mainstream
discourse of the time, and offered a fresh perspective.
Asad gives an example of how secularism is guilty of the very injustices it claims to overcome.
He argues that while in Islam for instance “there are basic cultural categories that define citizens
as necessarily unequal,” (meaning that non-Muslims do not enjoy the same privileges under
Islam,) similar inequality exists in the modern state. In the modern state, those not belonging to

29
30

Id.
KHALED FAHMY, IN QUEST OF JUSTICE: ISLAMIC LAW AND FORENSIC MEDICINE IN MODERN EGYPT 23 (2018).
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the dominant majority group, would be treated as “‘minorities’ unwilling or unable to assimilate
to the national culture.’”31 His work rightly pokes holes in the long-held superiority of the
secular order. Nonetheless, his critique falls into historicism, idealizes pre-modern religious
governance and fails to offer alternatives to secularism.32
In his classic, Formations of the Secular, he dedicates a chapter to the secularization of Shari'a in
colonial Egypt. In the chapter, he argues that colonial modernization and secularization of the
Egyptian legal system led to a situation where Shari'a is relegated to the private sphere leading to
conceptual changes of the law in which there is an artificial separation of morality and law.
These changes led to a system engineered to create a new public morality that is more
Europeanized. He is not concerned with the restriction of Shari’a as much as he is with the
conceptual changes it allowed.33
Laying the ground for his argument, he argues that secularism did not exist in Egypt before
modernity. He relayed the story of modernizing Egyptian legal system - “narrowing of Shari'a
jurisdiction and importation of European legal codes” - from the perspective of how these
changes made secularism “thinkable as a practical proposition” in Egypt.34 In his view the
process took place in mimicry of the West, instead of building on “preexisting shari¯‘a
traditions.”35 According to him, the Egyptian jurist Tariq al-Bishri contends that “the mimicry”
of the West was motivated by “European coercion and Egyptian elites’ infatuation with
European ways.” He views the shift that saw the implementation of Mixed Courts codes in
National Courts as an “...Aspiration for a Westernized future rather than for a reformed
continuity of the recent past.” Prior to the move, Husayn Fakhri Pasha had described Mixed
Courts codes as more suitable to Egyptian’s than Shari'a courts and more consistent with the
“arrangements to which they were accustomed.”36

31

TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 254 (2003).
Atalia Omer, Modernists Despite Themselves: The Phenomenology of the Secular and the Limits of Critique as an
Instrument of Change, 83 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 27–71 (2015),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24488130 (last visited May 12, 2021).
33
Fahmy, supra note 30.
34
Asad, supra note 31, at 208.
35
Id at 212.
36
Id at 215.
32
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Asad argues that the hybrid system confining Shari'a to personal status issues is “precisely a
secular formula for privatizing ‘religion.’”37 This point is key to this thesis and was expounded
on by Mahmood, particularly relating to the Coptic community. Defending his argument on the
secularizing effect of that system, Asad refers to Mohamad Abduh’s take on Shari'a in a report
that he compiled in 1899. In the report, Abduh makes a distinction between private and public,
and places family affairs within the private, and argues that Shari'a courts should take charge of
that private domain. Interestingly, Abduh also called for the independence of Shari'a courts from
government. His reference is used as support for the restriction of Shari'a to personal status
matters being a secularizing move in that Shari'a as religious was confined to the same private
space as personal status matters, which are also private.
Asad continues to defend his argument:
It is because the legal formation of the family gives the concept of individual morality its
own “private” locus that the shari¯‘a can now be spoken of as “the law of personal
status”—qa¯nu¯n al-ahwa¯l al-shakhsiyya. In this way it becomes the expression of a
secular formula, defining a place in which “religion” is allowed to make its public
appearance through state law.38
Perhaps indeed the restriction of Shari'a to the private locus of the family has a secularizing
effect, but it remains far from secular. Instead of perceiving the move as confining religion to the
private, one can look at the same set of events as entrenching a place for religion in a space that
is public - government and court - that invades the confines of the private family.
Perhaps Asad’s argument would have been more grounded and consistent with the practical
realm, if Abduh’s recommendation had been followed by the government and Shari'a courts
became independent of all government intervention. However, that is not the case. From the
onset of the modernization, and today, the government administers Shari'a.
At the heart of his argument is the secularization project’s separation of morality and law, which
he primarily observes in the work of Ahmad Safwat. According to Safwat, morality pertained to
37
38

Id at 229.
Id at 230.

12

transgressions that are punishable in the afterlife, while law pertained to transgressions that it
punishes in this world. Explaining why the distinction was damaging, Asad argues: “If
traditionally embodied conceptions of justice and unconsciously assimilated experience are no
longer relevant to the maintenance of law’s authority, then that authority will depend entirely on
the force of the state expressed through its codes.” He continues, “I argue that it is the power to
make a strategic separation between law and morality that defines the colonial situation, because
it is this separation that enables the legal work of educating subjects into a new public
morality.”39
The author agrees with Asad that reforming Shari'a within a secularization project that opted for
restricting it to personal status matters was problematic (The colonizer/reformer had found that
to also secularize personal status law would be a drastic change.). However, while Asad critiques
the process for its artificial separation of morality and law, as he dissects its colonial
underpinnings and motivations, the author finds it problematic in its wedding the state to religion
in a perpetual bond. What if the reformers had instead actually relegated the implementation of
Shari'a to the private sphere? Perhaps Shari'a would not have been removed from its original
dynamic and fluid pre-modern legal framework, and the state would not have been entangled in
the enforcement of Shari'a (and Christian and Jewish canon laws) on believers, nominal and real.
Had an arrangement along these lines been devised, a secular order that accommodates religion
may have been possible, in a fashion that promotes the religious freedom of the majority and the
minority.
In his book, In Quest of Justice, historian Khaled Fahmy critiques Asad’s argument that
secularizing and modernizing Egypt has sprung from a separation of ethics from Islamic law. He
contends that that separation had always existed in an Islamic discursive tradition.40 He takes
issue with the methodological approach Asad employs in that it focuses on the conceptual
changes dismissing archival research as a means of gauging them.41 He explains that it is
especially that archival research that exposes not just the changes, but also how and when they
39
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came about. His book posited that during the reign of Mohamed Ali’s descendants, and prior to
the British occupation of 1882, Egypt’s modernization project “continued to regard Islamic law
as a foundation for justice while borrowing scientific techniques from Europe without fear of
cultural contamination.” Fahmy also pinpointed that Asad idealizes pre-modern Islamic law and
overlooks the role of the state in legislating Islamic law.42 In so doing, he unreflexively views
Shari’a through a fiqhi discursive tradition, “in the double sense that it is a product of the
discursive tradition of the fuqaha.’ (jurists) and is based solely on ethics and aimed at the
cultivation of the virtues, with no role in state politics.”43 Fahmy’s book contends that it is
possible that other discursive traditions existed, in which conceptions of Shari’a legality entailed
both fiqh and siyasa.
Asad’s legacy has also been criticized for adopting “an anti-realist and reactionary position.” A
position that affects his pupils’ ability to contribute to a conversation aiming to find alternatives
to the “the hegemonic discourse” they rightly critique. Atalia Omer refers to academics taking
Asad’s analysis of the secular and religious as the foundation of their work as Asadians. Chief
among them are Saba Mahmood and Hussein Agrama. She criticizes their critique of the
discourse of religious freedoms through a genealogical framework for relying “on a reactionary,
overly intellectualized, reductionist account of modernity.” She adds that their critique falls into
the pits of:44
Theorizing Christianity as only hegemonic and missionary, articulating a purist conception
of an antecedent tradition prior to the advent of the modern state, locating agency
disproportionately in the geopolitical and ideological unfolding of Western (Christiancentric) hegemonic discourse, and developing a crucial challenge to the liberal
domestication of religion while also resisting analysis of the entanglement and coimbrication of religion and nationalism.45
Omer’s multi-faceted critique is supported in this paper through the examination of Mahmood’s
take on Egypt’s Coptic minority.
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2. Saba Mahmood’s Critique of Secularism
Following in Asad’s footsteps, Mahmood studies the situation of the Coptic minority in Egypt,
arguing that “modern secular governance has contributed to the exacerbation of religious
tensions in postcolonial Egypt, hardening interfaith boundaries and polarizing religious
differences.”46 In her book, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report, she takes
Egypt as a case in point to demonstrate the shortcomings of the secular project globally. She
takes issue with the secular project’s failure to deliver on its promises of religious liberty and
equality and draws parallels between its implementation in Egypt and the West. Mahmood
concedes that Egypt’s political secularism is not exemplar, but insists dismissing Egypt’s secular
project for its flaws “blinds us to common features of the secular project shared by Middle
Eastern and Euro-Atlantic societies.”47
Permeating her book is an attempt to exonerate religion, as essentialized by the West, and to hold
the regulation of religion by the state, through political secularism, responsible for the plight of
minorities in the West and non-West. In that vein, she argues:
While Islamic concepts and practices are crucial to the production of this inequality (that
experienced by Copts), I argue that the modern state and its political rationality have played
a far more decisive role in transforming preexisting religious differences, producing new
forms of communal polarization, and making religion more rather than less salient to
minority and majority identities alike.48
Indeed Islamic concepts may play a limited role, depending on how the consecutive governments
chose to employ them for their political ends. However, to claim that the modern state has “a far
more decisive role,” seems to downplay a long Coptic history under the pre-modern state in
which Copts were persecuted and lived at the whim of rulers. How comparable is the widespread
persecution under Dhimmitude to current day “polarization” and sectarianism?
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Ascribing to an understanding of secularism that focuses on its Christian origin, Mahmood
argues that secular neutrality is a Euro-Atlantic norm imposed by colonialism on the non-West.
To support her point she quotes the Lautsi v. Italy decision (2011) of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) which justified allowing the display of crucifixes in classrooms by
describing the crucifix as a symbol of the secular state itself, as it was Christianity that gave rise
to the acceptance of diversity. The quote used by Mahmood holds truth, but the attribution it
makes to Christianity could be made to Islam and other value systems:
Looking beyond appearances it is possible to discern a thread linking the Christian
revolution of two thousand years ago to the affirmation in Europe of the right to liberty of
the person and to the key elements of the Enlightenment . . . namely, the liberty and
freedom of every person, the declarations of the rights of man, and ultimately the modern
secular state. . . . It can therefore be contended that in the present-day social reality the
crucifix should be regarded not only as a symbol of a historical and cultural development,
and therefore of the identity of our people, but also as a symbol of a value system: liberty,
equality, human dignity and religious toleration, and accordingly also of the secular
nature of the state.49
Granted the crucifix does symbolize the secular nature of the state, would its Christian roots be
grounds for dismissing the secular project? Lama Abu Odeh addresses that specific point. In her
review of Mahmood’s book, she states that in countering the essentialization of Islam, Mahmood
provides “an account that moves between crude historicism - secularism is its history - and
formalist generalizations reminiscent of the ways “Islam” is treated in mainstream discourse.
Islam is nothing but the history.”50
As part of secularizing Egypt post-independence, a hybrid system governing the personal status
affairs of Islam-recognized religious minorities was devised. The system, which was described as
a “neo-millet” system, due to its semblance to its preceding Ottoman arrangement, entailed lay51
courts applying the religious laws of the minorities to cases involving their adherents.52 The
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botched arrangement is at the heart of Mahmood’s critique of secularism. She argues that the
system, in its secularism, led to “family law bear[ing] an inordinate weight in the reproduction
and preservation of religious identity.” The secular nature of the process, in her view, is due to
“Religion, sexuality, and the family [being] relegated to the private sphere... thereby conjoining
their legal and moral fates.”53 For the court to apply a religious law, to any member of society,
whether that member chooses or not, is hardly a product of secularism. If anything, it is the
opposite, as demonstrated by the varying definitions presented earlier. The fact that the system
moved from being purely religious administered by religious institutions, to being religious, but
administered by lay judges, does not in any way make it secular.
Abu Odeh addresses this misconception and refutes that this system can be attributed to
secularism. “Whatever invisible line there is that separates ‘secularism’, with all the internal
possibilities of its articulation, is crossed here to something that is ‘not-secularism’,” she argued,
mentioning Egypt’s quintessential law on the issue that demonstrates the contradiction in
Mahmood’s reading. She states that under this system Egyptian law stipulates that one can only
marry “according to the doctrine of the religion you are born into.” Abu Odeh axiomatically
adds:
If, however, the Egyptian state kept the rule above, namely, ‘the duty to marry according
to religious law’, but also allowed for an opt-out right of marrying according to ‘civil
law’ and made this right available to all Egyptians, then we would still be within the
domain of the “religious liberty” of secularism. But then if such an option existed, many
Egyptians, Muslims and otherwise, would have flocked to this opt-out, thereby
“minimizing” religious difference. It would then be hard to argue, as Mahmood does, that
it was “secularism” that exaggerated religious “difference” (or gender inequality); and the
more common one that it was unfinished secularism that was the culprit would make
much more sense.54
The point Abu-Odeh makes holds for a number of legal arrangements involving the state’s
regulation of religious difference. In those arrangements, it is clear that it is the manner in which
it regulates difference that accentuates it, not the mere regulation. This holds true for the new
Church Construction Law and the yet-to-be issued Personal Status Law for non-Muslims, as will
be demonstrated later in this thesis.
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Applying a similar rationale to Egypt’s Baha'i minority, who do not enjoy the same “autonomy”
or rights as Copts, Mahmood examines how Egyptian courts have dealt with the question of
recognizing their “outlawed” faith. She compares the Egyptian courts’ employment of secular
concepts to deny basic Baha’i rights to that of the European Human Rights Court in their denial
of the religious liberty of their Muslim minorities. In her comparative exercise, Mahmood
attempts to highlight the failure of secular political rationality to maintain religious liberty
(which she contests as a concept) while maintaining public order, yet another secular production.
She pinpoints the inherent tension in the secular order, where the sovereign state is committed to
civil and political equality in its regulation of religious difference, while also having the
prerogative of preserving the values and traditions of the majority. Animating this tension,
Mahmood argues, the state “inevitably must make normative judgments about what religion is or
ought to be and its proper place in the social life of a polity.”55
Baha’is in Egypt have struggled for the recognition of their religion in government identification
documents since Nasser outlawed their religious activities in the 60’s. They had lived peacefully
in Egypt since the 1800’s, and were only banned due to the headquarters of the Baha'i
international community being in Israel, at the height of the tensions with the neighboring state.
The Baha'is’ judicial struggle for recognition started after the ban, which they challenged in
court. Court after court would rule to the effect that they do not enjoy the same civil rights of
adherents of “heavenly religions,” explicitly stipulating their inequality to them. In 1975, the
Supreme Court upheld the ban “declar[ing] that the Egyptian state was only obligated to treat
those individuals as equals ‘who are comparable to each other with respect to their legal status—
[that is,] Muslim should be treated as equal to other Muslims, and Christians to other Christians
or to Jews, but Christians should not necessarily be treated as equal to Muslims, or Bahais to
Christians.’”56 In 1983, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favor of a Baha'i’s right to
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have his religion registered in his identification documents, however, cautioned that their public
practice of their religion continued to be prohibited in Shari'a.57 This ruling was later overturned.
When government civil records were digitized, the computer generated religious affiliation
choices did not include the Baha’i faith, only the “heavenly” religions of Islam, Christianity and
Judaism. The community had to resort to courts again, which regardless of the outcome of their
rulings maintained the same rationale. In 2006, a lower administrative court ruled in favor of the
Baha'is right to register their chosen faith on their IDs, arguing that the explicit mention of their
Baha’i faith on their IDs was essential for the government to treat them accordingly, lest it
affords them rights only reserved for adherents of heavenly religions. In other words, including
their religion on their ID’s was necessary to maintain their inequality with their Muslim,
Christian and Jewish counterparts. The court ruling argued, “Islamic jurisprudence requires a
disclosure that would allow [a distinction to be made] between a Muslim and non-Muslim in
their exercise of social life, so as to establish the range of rights and obligations reserved for
Muslims that others cannot avail of.”58 This ruling was also overturned, and finally the Supreme
Administrative Court allowed Bahais to include a dash instead of “Baha’i” in their IDs, albeit
asserting that their public practice of their religion is against public order.59 These emblematic
court decisions were issued under Mubarak at the height of the endorsement,
“institutionalization,” and “idealization” of the concept of the Civil State.60
Mahmood relays the Baha’i struggle in Egyptian courts, and compares it to that of Muslims in
the ECtHR. One prominent case she refers to is that of a Muslim Swiss teacher where the ECtHR
confirmed the federal government’s decision that “The wearing of a headscarf and loose-fitting
clothes remains an outward manifestation which, as such, is not part of the inviolable core of
freedom of religion.”61 In its decision, the court passed judgement on the practice itself as
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promoting inequality between men and women, and used its judgement as grounds for denying
the teacher her freedom to wear her veil:
It appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality.
It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the
message of tolerance, respect for others, and above all, equality and non-discrimination
that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.
In a manner similar to that of the Egyptian court, the ECtHR invoked public order, and passed
value judgement on Islamic practices, effectively circumscribing Muslim manifestation of
religion.
The similarities that Mahmood brings to light serve the purpose of exposing that the West
attempts to hold the Global South to standards it does not fully maintain. Nonetheless, there
needs to be emphasis on the fact that the employment of the same secular rationality that attaches
more weight to majoritarian public order than to religious freedom does not lead to the same
outcomes in the states that are the subject of Mahmood’s comparison. One has to pay attention to
the degree to which those countries compromise religious freedom for the sake of public order.
There is a wide range of regulated manifestation. The circumscription of any is surely grievous
to the adherents of the religion. Nonetheless, from a pragmatic perspective, there are limitations
that are more tortuous than others. One could try to gauge the gradation based on the level of
manifestation circumscribed. For instance, the manifestation on an ID card, that is carried by the
adherent of the minority religion, concealed in their wallet or pocket, and only shared with
government officials for administration of their personal affairs, is hardly public. A building with
religious symbols,62 or religious attire, visible to everyone is a more public manifestation. An
adherent’s religious attire worn serving as a public servant is even more symbolic as they act as
representatives of the state. The distinction made here does not at all aim to belittle the harm
caused to the minorities in Europe, nor does it refute the double-standard secular rationale
applied by the court pertaining to the manifestation of other religions. However, the distinction
shows that from the perspective of the affected minority in Egypt, whose most basic religious
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freedom is breached, the secular formula has significant improvement to offer, even if it does not
eradicate the perennial problem altogether.
Interestingly, Mahmood exonerates religious intolerance from the infringement on Baha’i
religious liberty altogether. Instead of acknowledging the role of the implementation of a
religiously intolerant interpretation of Shari'a, she argues that it is the “secularization of Shari'a”
that led to this inequality. She explains that it is the flawed, out of place, implementation of
Shari'a by Egypt that is at the heart of the issue. She contends that Shari'a is taken out of its
originally fluid and flexible context, into the liberal legal meta-context, with which it conflicts.
She adds that in Egypt, judges, without any religious training,63 pass Shari'a rulings, which had
been codified in a manner that is contradictory to the very nature of Shari'a. But what would a
Shari'a ruling taken in the accommodating context entail? History tells us, and she refers
passingly to that, that in implementation of Shari'a non-Abrahamic religious minorities were
“tolerated and integrated.” Toleration and integration is indeed a much lower threshold than what
a secularism, that does not attempt to retain a religious component, offers, even in its most antireligious articulations.
In her critique of Mahmood’s book, Abu-Odeh refers to Mahmood’s “nostalgic” reference to the
Ottoman empire’s Dhimmi system, insinuating that it offered minorities more religious freedom.
Abu-Odeh vehemently disagrees that the Dhimmitude is comparable to modern Egypt:
If [Ahl Al Zhimma] had to pay Jizya (tax) to buy off their corporate independence and if
they had to be formally placed as second in status to the Muslim majority then the tradeoff may not have been so bad. In other words, Mahmood seems to suggest that the tradeoff between second class status for corporate status is superior to the one posited by the
modern secular state between equal citizenship for minoritarian status combined with the
grant of religious liberty.64
Mahmood’s comparison of the two incomparable situations stems from her overarching critique
of modernity, where she dismisses individual autonomy and freedom as Christian and Euro-
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centric. According to Omer, this is evident in her earlier work on pious Muslim women in
Egypt.65
In conclusion, this overview of Mahmood’s critique and response to some of the arguments
shows her essentialization of modernity and secularism and downplaying pre-modern injustices.
The next section looks at Egyptian secularism, as well as at its derivatives: the “Civil State”
which is used as an alternative term, and religious liberty as a constitutive component of
secularism.

G. Secularism in Egypt
Mahmood’s critique of the Egyptian secularism does not preclude that Egypt - in its public
opinion and generally accepted national identity - does not at all identify as secular today.
Describing the place of religion in Egyptian society, buzzwords include a “Muslim state,” “civil
state,” “a citizenship state,” but certainly not secular. The demise of the term was perhaps
concurrent with the neutralization of leftist powers under Sadat, which was also a time that saw a
process of “Islamization,” which necessarily meant the exclusion of the term. More recent
debate, post-2011, saw “intellectuals” try to rid the concept of its perception as anti-religious
among the public, but to no avail. The Egyptian public imagination perceived secularism as
possible only in its strictest articulation, and - as the long-abandoned secularization thesis posited
- inevitably meaning a decline in belief. The lengthy introduction on secularism that preceded
this section aims at qualifying the Egyptian perception of secularism, while also suggesting that
the concept continues to hold promise, despite its contestation and inherent tension.
If we were to place Egypt on Durham’s continuum, which offers a means for gauging the place
of religion in Egypt in relation to religious freedom, it would be placed as somewhere between
the Established Church and Religious Status categories. As he explains, this entails the state
identifying with a specific religion. In Egypt, that is Sunni Islam, represented by Al-Azhar, and
Coptic Orthodoxy, represented by the Coptic Orthodox Church. The state gives monopoly to
those institutions over religious life by restricting exit by adherents, who are also bound by
religious law in their personal status issues without a civil recourse option. Exit from Islam and
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Christianity is not recognized, unless it is from Islam to Christianity. Some divergent beliefs are
unofficially tolerated or unrecognized by the government, which does not guarantee their
religious liberty to worship, and also explicitly denies their equality to adherents of the
established religions. This group is subject to prosecution for blasphemy, suffers with
registration of marriages, births, and includes Baha’is and Shias.66
This arrangement has indeed accentuated religious difference, as Mahmood argues. The role of
the botched and despotic government regulation of religious difference in favor of the
established religions on one side, and in favor of Islam over Christianity on the other, has in fact
added fuel to fire when it comes to sectarian tensions and violence. Society’s deeply held sense
of religiosity is genuine, and is integral to national identity, even if it were encouraged by
governments consistently invoking religion to legitimize themselves and/or rally support.
Currently, for a political movement or party to espouse itself with secularism would mean that it
loses most of its popular support. That is due to the Egyptian national identity oscillating
between aspiring to reviving the glorious Islamic past through an Islamist project, and rejecting
an Islamist project, primarily for its corruption of religion by miring it in politics, while
maintaining its deeply held moderate religiosity. Secularism has no place in either. The concept
of the “Civil state,” conversely, had a different journey in Egyptian public imagination and
history.
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III. The Fake Consensus over “Civil State,” and the Politicization of Religious
Liberty
While advocating for Coptic rights under the banner of secularism had been stigmatized, and
rendered useless if not counterproductive to the cause, advocacy under the banner of “the civil
state” prevailed. The issue with it, however, was a state of “dissensus” over what it entails, in
addition to a prolonged process of devoiding it of meaning by claiming it for the purpose of
exporting a progressive image to the international community, without actually bringing it to
life.67 The same is true for other liberal democratic notions that had found their way to
government and opposition discourses, but meant different things to the different factions.68
This chapter surveys the history of the term Civil State, highlighting its inefficacy in promoting
more separation between religion and state. It concludes with a section on how the concept of
religious liberty, a constitutive component of secularism, was also compromised due to its
colonial history and employment in the persecution discourse that typically villainizes Islam.

A. Introduction and Initial Debate
The concept of the Civil State found its way to Egypt from republican philosophers and Christian
intellectuals in the 19th century. The discourse of the time was one in which the West, or those
inspired by its progress, persuaded the Arab world to adopt civil rule that separates religion from
government. One of the early proponents of civil society, Fatah Antun, called for equality of all
citizens under civil rule where Christians enjoy the same rights as their Muslim counterparts.
While initially rejected as “secularist and alien” to Islam and provoked rejection and even
punishment, it found its way into public debate.69 One early response to the concept was by
Islamic scholar and jurist Mohammed ‘Abduh, who argued that Islam adopted civil rule from its
inception. He contended that there is no theocracy in Islam, and that because the state is not
theocratic, then it is civil. He supported his argument by the fact that in Islamic Shari'a people
choose the ruler, and the ruler is not deemed infallible. In his understanding, the religious
establishment in that civil state would be “enlightened, reasonable and tolerant.” Limor Lavie,
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who traces the genealogy of the term in Egyptian history, describes that model as one based on a
“middle-way model that combines religion and modernity.” She explains, however, that while
the concept was legitimated to some extent, it remained “marginal” and primarily utilized in
dialogue with the West to portray Islam as compatible with Western modernity.7071
The 1970s saw a more robust debate surrounding the term catalyzed by the rise of Islamist
groups and an Islamic revival. President Anwar Al-Sadat had allowed Islamists some degree of
freedom to engage in politics to counterweight his leftist opposition. Sadat also took historical
steps towards codifying into the constitution of 1971 what had already been the lived reality in
Egypt. He designated Islam the state religion, and enshrined the “principles of Shari'a” as “a
primary source of legislation.” The “Islamization” of Egyptian society was sadly accompanied
by violence against the Coptic community and rising tensions between them and their Muslim
counterparts. Sadat’s decade in office would witness the birth of a vicious cycle of sectarian
violence surrounding houses of worship and inter-faith romantic relations that would prevail
until today.72
This period marked the end of the term “secular,” which according to Lavie, “became an insult
often accompanied by accusations of heresy and atheism.” She explains that the less provocative
alternative term, “civil,” found its way to liberal discourse to replace “secular.” In her words, the
term “denoted a state that separates religion from politics and legislation but at the same time
honors Islam as the supreme source of values and culture.” “Civil” intellectuals used a similar
rhetoric to Abdu’s at the time while promoting a civil state. They argued that Islam did not
instate a religious but a civil state, in which people are sovereign. During that era, the term was
additionally enlisted to differentiate between Sunni Muslim countries and Iran, where a
revolutionary Islamic regime had triumphed to the dismay and embarrassment of its regional
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neighbors. Despite some success, the term continued to evoke angry responses, especially from
the activist historically Salafist-leaning student body of Al-Azhar.73
After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak initiated a crackdown on Islamists and embraced the
notion of the civil state in opposition to them. The debate over the term had continued into his
term, with more Brotherhood factions accepting it in an attempt to survive his regime’s tightened
grip and find a place in the new political order. According to Lavie, the Brotherhood “adopted a
more pragmatic discourse, meant to soften its extremist image.” This discourse included an
acceptance of popular sovereignty in the form of a Western model of democracy. The change in
discourse took place to the backdrop of increased terrorism, from which they needed to distance
themselves. This time saw division within the Muslim Brotherhood over the term, with the old
guard rejecting it due to its secular connotations, and the wassatiyya current endorsing it.74
Nonetheless, “the term civil state embarrassed Islamists and required convoluted explanations to
render it palatable and compatible with their values.”75 For them at the time, and also today, it
was easier to define the civil state through what it was not. For the Brotherhood of the 90’s, the
civil state they endorsed is one that is not a theocracy, and not a military state. It is civil in that it
is run by civilians, and those civilians implement Shari'a. Their negative definition of the civil
state would prevail until their ascent to power in 2012.76

B. From Debate to “Institutionalization” and “Idealization”
The open debate that was taking place between Muslim Brotherhood figures espousing this
interpretation, and others advocating for a rigorous separation of state and religion, such as Farag
Fouda, was intense and sadly culminated with the assassination of Fouda for his ideas. His
assassination heralded a government endorsement of civil state. Lavie contends that the
assassination triggered the Mubarak regime’s more comprehensive endorsement of the term. The
assassination, in her view, had signaled that the debate “had spun out of control.” Mubarak’s
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endorsement also entailed forging a forced unity over the term “through indoctrination…deliberalization and de-Islamization of the public arena.”77
Perhaps the assassination indeed signified the militant opposition of the term by Islamists had
gone overboard, and therefore triggered the Mubarak regime’s response.78 However, it was also
in the interest of the regime to export to the West that it is progressive compared to its
fundamentalist alternative. Lavie mentions some of the steps taken by the regime in the context
of institutionalizing secularism. These included the minimalist reading of Article 2 of the
constitution by the Supreme Constitutional Court and the constitutional amendments of 2007,
which included an amendment defining the state as based on citizenship in article 1. The addition
was aimed at guaranteeing equality for all citizens. These changes were perceived, however, as
purely cosmetic, without any consequence on the ground. They were also portrayed as “a
panacea for all of Egypt’s ills.”79
Perhaps evidence to the nominal nature of the endorsement of the concept was that Egyptian
courts continued to define public order through Shari'a. The legal struggle of Baha’is, most of
which took place under Mubarak, is a case in point. When their basic religious freedom was
contested in court, judges routinely invoked a public order argument referring to Islam being the
official state religion in their denial of the community’s demands for recognition.
Reflecting on the process in which this “institutionalization” took place, Sebastian Elsässer
describes it as a part of a larger project of “more stable incorporation80 of liberal techniques of
governance into the power strategy of the regime.” He agrees, however, that the process did not
entail “a genuine transition toward liberal democracy, but an updating of Egyptian
authoritarianism as compared to its earlier stages.”81 Interestingly, it was Gaber Usfur’s
theorization of the term that was adopted by Mubarak. Usfur would later have a tumultuous
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relationship with Azhar, which would end in his defeat and ultimate removal from his position as
Minister of Culture under President Sisi.82

C. Islamist Endorsement of the “Civil State”
The Mubarak regime’s efforts to “institutionalize” the concept were so effective, that for the
Muslim Brotherhood to reject it on grounds of its contradiction to Islam would mean being
labeled extremist. The group therefore moved towards endorsing it, by legitimating it from an
Islamic perspective, which argues that the Muslim state is civil in that it is not theocratic. Lavie
underscored Yusuf Al-Qaradwi’s shift in ideology, in which he coined the term, “A civil state
with a religious source of authority - Dawla madaniya thaata marge’eiya deeniya.” His
endorsement of the term in a 1996 book paved the way for the group to follow in his footsteps
and to eventually include it in its official platform. The group’s nominal endorsement was not
convincing too many, however. Lavie points to the ambiguity of their position on key aspects of
the civil state. They would adopt contradictory positions on the enactment of Shari'a and on
where they stood from civil equality for women and non-Muslims.83
The January 2011 revolution represented a moment that transcended debate over the place of
religion in the state. Hussein Agrama described that moment as “asecular,” in that the question
was not relevant to the key players in the square. While Agrama admires the moment, and calls
for better understanding of its exceptionalism, it ceases as soon as political competition for
authority begins.84 The political openness that followed the revolution thawed the facade of
consensus over the civil state, with factions organizing and taking part in politics freely for the
first time in decades. The range of voices ranged from outright secular to outright theocratic,
which reignited the debate over the civil nature of the state, and what that entails.85
With the Supreme Council for Armed Forces taking over after the revolution, and becoming an
“omnipotent” force in politics, the civil state debate was increasingly in reference to the state’s
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non-military nature. This had led to more “fudging” up of the meaning of the concept. That angle
of the concept was not new, however, as Egypt’s military has been in the forefront of politics
even before its independence.86 The civil state was again increasingly defined by what it is not.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party defined it as such:
The Islamic state is by nature a civil(ian) state [dawla madaniyya], for it is not a military
state, ruled by the army, which seizes power through military coups and governs through
dictatorial decrees...Furthermore, it is not a religious state (a theocracy), ruled by an
echelon of clerics — for Islam does not have a priesthood...and it is certainly not a [state]
ruled by divine right.87

D. Egypt: Civil State in Rhetoric Only
Despite the apparent consensus around the term, “Civil State,” which is primarily due to the
ambiguity surrounding it, civil forces failed to include it in key documents. In August 2011, an
attempt by SCAF to include the term in a “supra-constitutional principles” document that was
aimed at curbing the Islamists’ plans to transform Egypt into a religious state, failed especially
due to the term. The document, which was drafted by legal expert Ali Al-Silmi, and was known
as the Silmi document, had failed to garner enough support, as opposed to the Azhar
corresponding document. The key difference between the two was the absence of the term in the
second one. According to former Minister of Culture, and longstanding Azhar critic Gaber Usfur,
agreement over the Azhar document was only possible after the term was omitted.88
“Civil State” would naturally fail to make it into the Muslim Brotherhood constitution, but also
in the 2014 constitution. Even amid the anti-Islamist euphoria that followed the 2013 ouster of
the Muslim Brotherhood, political forces were not able to overcome the Islamic institution’s veto
of the term. Azhar’s significant weight guaranteed that the inclusion would be impossible. The
world-renowned Sunni seat of learning had just legitimated the ouster of the first democratically
elected president, and it had earned its seat on the table. There was not only lack of consensus
over the term, the players were not transparent about their positions to the point that the
assembly was surprised by a “typo” that had become a foundational part of the constitution.
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After agreement over the inclusion of “civil rule” instead of “civil state,” during voting, Amr
Moussa, the Secretary General of the Assembly, read a copy that had replaced “rule” by
“government,” further constricting the term. It was approved by the unsuspecting committee of
50, who noticed the change too late. There was no room for later amending the term, even
though it was not what the forces had agreed to include.89 The ultimate change was attributed to
the Justice ministry committee, which had supposedly amended the final version agreed upon by
the members. The Church had voiced its dismay at the sudden change, but expressed its overall
acceptance and welcome of the new Constitution, which had most of their demands met.90
In an interview after the constitution was approved by the Committee, Bishop Paula establishes
the futility of the term “civil”:
After that achievement [the removal of article 219], I took the initiative and suggested we
compromise on the inclusion of the word “civil” for the sake of consensus. So, the term
civil [state] does not add anything. But [Salafis] perceive the word “civil” as a barrier
against their existence. I am cognizant of their feelings about that. The Grand Mufti
suggested changing the wording from civil state to civil rule....What matters is the
essence and substance. If the articles are civil, then we can dispose of the title, but if they
were religious, what use is the title?91
Bishop Paula’s position on the term is emblematic of the extent to which it had been devoided of
meaning.
In Egypt, “Citizenship” or Al-Muwatana, has been utilized in mainstream discourse to play a
similar role to “civil state.” It had come to exclusively refer to the “[I]rrelevance of religious
affiliation in certain areas of the legal system,” with other aspects of citizenship such as gender
equality, political participation and class mobility have been marginalized.92 It probably enjoys
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more consensus than the other terms discussed in this paper, but sadly remains just as inefficient
in exacting real change.
This overview of the history of the term, Civil State, highlighted its inefficacy in promoting more
separation of religion and state, due to the lack of consensus on its meaning. When situations
arose for it to be used in the sense relating to the place of religion, as demonstrated, it was
discarded for lack of consensus on its connotation in this regard.

E. Religious Liberty and the Persecution Discourse
“Civil state” and “secularism” both entail religious liberty. The term, however, has had a life of
its own in Egypt. One that, sadly, lead to its marring as well. The religious liberty of Coptic
Christians is the core issue for the community in Egypt. It is their religious liberty that is at stake
when they cannot build a church, or when the government refuses to acknowledge the chosen
faith of new Christians. Most Christians would argue that they enjoy the freedom to believe, and
few would even argue that they enjoy even more freedom than Christians in the West.93 It is,
however, a fact that Copts’ religious liberty, particularly pertaining to building churches,
registering their Christian faith, proselytization and discussing other faiths freely, is
circumscribed.94
Religious liberty, nonetheless, has been a tainted platform. The primary reason is that the right,
as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has a long-standing history of
imperialism and missionary origins, and was often the pretext of intervention in the region by
Western powers. In her book, Religious Difference in a Secular Age, Saba Mahmood gives a
historical overview of the right and its problematic past. Mahmood also demonstrates how the
right effectively “secures the distinction between public and private that is so foundational to
secular political rule.95 Mahmood’s interest in religious liberty is primarily due to its being a
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constitutive component of secularism, which in her view, is a primary source of sectarian tension
in Egypt. Mahmood additionally highlights that while religious liberty played a role in
developing state sovereignty in the West, it has been ground for its violation in the non-Christian
world.
The history of European intervention on behalf of Christian minorities in the Middle East has
been explored by many. It started with the seemingly benign diplomatic-like “capitulations” that
the weakened Ottoman Empire granted to its European traders. Those entailed the right to “selfgovern,” not only in matters of criminal and civil jurisdiction, but also in relation to religion. The
privileges granted under capitulations would expand to cover European missionaries and even
local Ottoman Christians.96 The capitulations, which lead the way to European states having the
right to offer “protection” to specific local subjects due to their religious affiliation, did not just
violate the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, but also made Europe an actor in its domestic
affairs.
Further spoiling the term was that those powers were advocating standards of religious liberty,
they did not uphold. Trying to capture their disingenuous advocacy for religious liberty in the
Empire, Mahmood explains that contemporaneously Jews in Europe were forced to live in
Ghettos, and their emancipation was yet to be achieved. She explains that it could be argued that
Christian minorities under Ottoman rule enjoyed a larger degree of freedom or equality, but then
interjects that using the terms would be “anachronous,” as “inequality was the norm; just as
women were unequal to men and slaves unequal to masters, non-Muslims were not equal to
Muslims.”97
While Mahmood argues against the concept as occidentally developed and enforced through
International Law, historian Paul Sedra refers to modern reasons for its marginalization. He
explains it is the use of “religious liberty” and “minority rights,” as part of “the persecution
discourse” that is the culprit. He contends that the politicization of violations faced by Copts over
centuries had produced that discourse, which is sadly associated with essentialization of Islam,
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and even Islamophobia. This politicization and the prevalence of the persecution discourse have
led to a general avoidance of research into sectarianism and Coptic identity in fear of association
with the discourse’s Islamophobic stance, according to Sedra.
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IV. Promoting Secularism and Coptic Activism
In the previous discussion of the liberal concepts of secularism and religious liberty, I do not
refer to how Copts themselves employ them. This is partly due to a national unity rhetoric in
Egypt, which started in the early twentieth century and lasted until today. The rhetoric has
treated community demands as “sectarian aberrations from the national consensus.”98 This in
turn has had a limiting effect on Coptic activism. In his book, Elsässer explains how the
community selectively used the terms when defining collective Coptic rights vis-a-vis the
government, but not when addressing individual Copts rights. He also offered an analysis of the
differences in discourses applied by distinct Coptic entities: The Church, Coptic Human Rights
lawyers, Coptic expatriates and others.
The 1919 revolution had generated a rhetoric of national unity that had made it “taboo” to raise
Coptic demands. The genuine unity would sadly be short-lived, with Christians being ostracized
once again with the Islamic revivalism that emerged in the 1940’s. After the 1952 coup, the
situation would only worsen, leading to the marginalization of Coptic demands for the remainder
of the century. The official position, according to Elsässer, was that “Copts [are] not
discriminated against, nor are they a minority.” During the last quarter of the century, alongside
Sadat’s move towards the codification of the Islamic identity of the state, Coptic rights’
discourse moved in the direction of demanding similar recognition. The primary protagonist of
the community of the time was the Church, which had secured its position as the exclusive
spokesperson for the community under Nasser. Describing how this era developed the Coptic
rights discourse, Elsässer argues:
Articulations of claims to “Coptic rights” have often taken a collective view on equality
and justice—sometimes to the detriment of individual freedom...Their secularism was
always motivated by a pragmatic search for the elimination of status differences with
Islam and the Muslims... To the extent that the state tended towards the incorporation and
“officialization” of Islam, Coptic rights discourses converged on the view that, in the
name of equality, Christianity should be awarded similar official recognition.99
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The Church’s employment of some liberal notions was not just limited, it was also confined to
the collective relationship of the community with the state. It maintained its conservatism with
regard to the community, in that it continued to reject civil marriage and divorce for community
members.
Perhaps one avenue where the limited adoption of the human rights discourse is best articulated
is Watani Newspaper. The discourse adopted by Egypt’s quintessential, and oldest, Coptic
newspaper, was one that addressed Coptic grievances, without embracing a human rights
discourse. It would cover these events in the context of decrying them for violating “national
unity.” Describing the wave of increased marginalization and discrimination of Copts in the
seventies, Editor-in-Chief, Youssef Sedhom used the word “humum,” meaning concerns.100
Interestingly, to-date, the header of the section addressing some of the gravest violations the
community faces in Egypt continues to carry that title.101 The paper’s website rarely features
stories of church attacks or other violations on its main page, which it reports thoroughly under
the mentioned section.102 The newspaper, which was founded in 1958, changed its outlook over
time. When the overall political climate allowed, the paper would adopt a bolder stance. Perhaps
the most significant period was the 1990’s and the 2010’s, when the Mubarak regime allowed for
a larger degree of press freedom.103
While maintaining a subtle tone on Coptic “concerns,” the paper adopted a discourse supportive
of the civil state, secularism, and separating state from religion. The website gives ample
coverage to prominent advocates of secularism, and often publishes op-eds supportive of limiting
the role of religion in government.
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V. The Anti-Secular Regulation of Religious Difference in Relevant
Legislation post-2013
The first part of the paper addresses the place of religion in relation to religious minorities as
expressed in terms of secularism, the Civil State, and briefly religious liberty. In this chapter, I
look at how they feature post-2013 through an analysis of relevant legal developments during
that period. I also test the arguments put forward by Mahmood against them to demonstrate the
gaps in her critique of secularism at large.

A. The 2014 Constitution
The quintessential legal moment post-2013 is certainly the 2014 Constitution. The 2014
Constitution is often compared to its predecessor and hailed as a victory in terms of religious
liberty and the status of minorities. Nonetheless, the constitution deeply entangles the religious
institutions in the regulation of the personal lives of the citizenry, which constituted a further step
away from secularity. The constitution also failed to offer any religious liberty to religious
groups apart from the Christian minority, a regression from the text of the 1971 constitution.
The very manner in which it was drafted is emblematic of its direction and philosophy. In the 50member drafting committee of the constitution, three clergymen represented Christians, with
only one other Christian in the committee;104 a stark statement on the unapologetic reduction of
Copts to their collective religious identities. This also further elevated the status, and power, of
the Church within the community. Azhar, Ifta and the Ministry of Awqaf had representatives, as
well. Bishop Paula, the Coptic Orthodox Church’s politico, led the other clergymen in the
negotiations and represented a power to reckon within the committee. Religious institutions, and
especially Al-Azhar, had always had representatives in Egypt’s constituent assemblies, but
perhaps in this particular assembly they enjoyed considerably more weight. Weight that is
arguably comparable only to the army and the judiciary, in case of Al-Azhar. Indeed, no other
entity was granted autonomy similar to those three institutions in the constitution.
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The Church eventually secured an article mandating the government to issue a law regulating the
construction of churches within the following parliament’s first legislative term. (The law was
issued in 2016.) Article 219 was also scrapped and substituted by a stipulation in the preamble
that the sources of Shari'a should be defined in congruence with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. The latter adopting a limited understanding of Shari'a.105 Upon the completion of the
drafting process, Pope Tawadros II appeared in a recorded video calling on Copts to vote yes on
the constitution.106
Article 3 of the constitution remained, and did not receive much discussion. The article, which
was considered as a historical gain in the 2012 constitution, stipulated, “The principles of the
laws of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of laws regulating their personal status,
religious affairs, and selection of spiritual leaders.” While the law comes in the context of
recognizing, and accommodating, the Christian minority, the absence of civil recourse for
Christians, necessarily means that the article restricts the rights of non-practicing Christians, or
Christians who simply wish to officiate their marriages in a manner that the Church does not
recognize.
The article represents recognition that the Community long advocated for, but practically only
codifies the status quo. The article does not address, nor remedy, the domains where Christians
are subject to Shari'a: Adoption and inheritance. Adoption is still illegal, although other similar
mechanisms are in place. And courts continue to apply Shari'a law to inheritance cases where
litigants are Christians. There were, however, some exceptional rulings, in which the court
decided to distribute inheritance equally between male and female heirs in accordance with
Christian canon laws based on Article 3.107 Also, in March 2021, Egypt’s leading human rights
organization, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, just succeeded in submitting a
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challenge to the constitutionality of the law requiring Courts to apply Shari'a law to inheritance
cases where litigants are Christian due to its violation of Article 3.108
Article 64 pertaining to religious freedom saw a minor change. It stipulated that religious
freedom is “absolute,” instead of a “guaranteed109 right,” in the 2013 constitution. Both restricted
the right to worship to adherents of the “revealed” or “heavenly” religions, meaning Islam and
People of the Book, Christians and Jews. Notably, both are more restrictive than the 1971
constitution, which had not explicitly restricted the right to worship to the recognized religions.
Article 46 of the 1971 constitution stipulated: “The State shall guarantee the freedom of belief
and the freedom of practice of religious rites.”110
The 2014 Constitution has not introduced significant change to Article 7 that pertains to Azhar. It
continued to enjoy its autonomy and freedom from oversight, and more importantly an allencompassing vague mandate as “the main authority for religious sciences, and Islamic affairs.”
This is perhaps a demotion from the previous article’s corresponding wording, “Al-Azhar Senior
Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.”111 Speaking of its entrenched
powers, Brown states, “More than even the police, and like the Supreme Constitutional Court, alAzhar becomes a self-perpetuating body under its senior leadership, accountable only to
itself.”112
The 2012 constitution’s article 44, which prohibited blasphemy against all prophets, was
removed. However, subsequent attempts to repeal the law failed.113
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It is worth noting that the constitution is not as consequential as one would expect from the
supreme law of the land. It is the last in a series of constitutions that “served existing regimes
rather than shaped them.” One that Brown described as instating a “security state with a
democratic face.”114 He made this sobering statement during the drafting of the 2014
constitution:
Of course, in the best of worlds the most progressive and airtight clauses will work their
effect only very slowly: with Egypt's legal framework and state structures thoroughly
authoritarian in their basic framework and modes of operation, nothing will change
overnight. As the committee members have elevated debates about freeing the media
from state shackles, Islamist broadcasters remain closed. As they deliberate over political
freedoms, the country's largest political party remains largely shuttered retaining only the
shell of a legal existence. As they craft language to allow protests and demonstrations,
supporters of the ousted government are harassed and hounded. None of this means that
the wording of the constitution is irrelevant, but even if the delegates agree on general
principles (which they have yet to do) and manage to codify that agreement in a skillful
manner, there will be much legal and institutional meat to put on the skeletal
constitutional framework.115
Pertaining to the key religion-related clauses, the discussion that took place in the Committee of
10 was especially enlightening. The Committee was formed by the Constitutional Declaration of
July 8, 2013. The Committee of experts included in its membership judges from Egypt’s judicial
entities and other legal experts. It was mandated with suggesting amendments to the 2012
constitution.116 The significance of their discussions is that while their views were guided by a
certain degree of political correctness, they were not entirely politicized, unlike the Committee of
50.
In the discussions, the dynamic pertaining to the religion-related articles was one where the
Committee largely opted for maintaining the status quo, with modest ambition for change. The
overarching discourses animating religious freedom and equality were notably absent. The legal
veterans instead referred to considerations that were marginal to the core issues. For instance,
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during their discussion of the religious freedom article. The judges who called for including the
adherents of the non-heavenly religions into the guarantee for freedom of worship used
arguments that did not address the key issues. One judge’s reasoning for the expansion of the
right was: “You are calling on Europe to allow you to build mosques, and for you to practice
your rituals inside them...You cannot demand something from European countries that you
continue to forbid for the non-Muslim in your country.”117 In the same vein, another jurist argued
that the UAE has allowed the building of houses of worship for the adherents of non-heavenly
religions, hinting at the expansion of the guarantee as good for business. This expansion of
freedom of worship was discussed particularly pertaining to Baha’is. The discussion did not
include reference to their citizenship rights, to Egypt being a civil state, and certainly not to
secularism. While those notions were not mentioned by name, their essence was part of the
discussion. One judge mentioned the need for the state to stand at an equal distance from
religions with regard to laws governing building houses of worship, for instance.
The Committee eventually adopted a more expansive freedom of religion article than the one
eventually ratified in the 2014 Constitution. Their suggested article stated: “Freedom of belief is
guaranteed. The state guarantees freedom to practice religious rituals, and facilitates the
establishment of houses of worship for heavenly religions, as regulated by law. ”118 The
contention, as explained above, surrounded the expansion of the guarantee to practice religious
rituals to adherents of all religions. The passage of the expansion was not unanimous, even
among the group of jurists representing Egypt’s top legal echelon, where no Salafis, Muslim
Brotherhood, or Azhar were represented. The expansion passed by six votes for and four
against.119 Interestingly, when the current 2014 constitution wording was being suggested,
former Speaker of the House of Representatives Ali Abdel-Al120 argued that excluding nonheavenly adherents from the guarantee criminalizes their practice of religious rituals.121
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The status of Azhar and Church featured prominently, where they were represented as equals
requiring similar treatment. For instance, one Committee member suggested that if the Church’s
article pertaining to the canon laws of Copts remains, that pertaining to Azhar should too. There
was agreement among the members that the articles pertaining to the institutions have not
introduced anything novel, but only codified the status quo, except for the phrase pertaining to
Azhar’s mandate to be consulted on religious issues. The members suggested that keeping both
articles, while they do not affect change, was to offer the institutions “assurance” that their status
will remain the same in the new political order. On the Azhar’s mandate to be consulted on
religious matters, however, the members were unapologetic in their criticism and scrapped it.122
As mentioned earlier, the phrase was reintroduced in the eventual constitution and replaced with
the slightly weaker wording: “[Al-Azhar] is the main authority for religious sciences, and Islamic
affairs.”
Drawing on the constitution and its drafting process, it is clear the terms - secularism, civil state,
and citizenship - are almost absent. The status quo threshold of religious freedom is entrenched,
and the expansion of the role of religious institutions is unabated. While the modernization and
secularization projects in Egypt originally aimed at marginalizing Church and Mosque by
nationalizing them and bringing them under state control, that process was reversed, with those
institutions regaining their autonomy from the state, and control over people’s lives gradually
since the seventies, and more openly since 2013.

B. The Church Construction Law
The 2014 Constitution additionally mandated that the new parliament issue a law governing the
construction of churches in its first legislative term.123 In accordance with this article, the House
of Representatives issued a new Church construction law in September 2016.124 The law was
hailed by the parliament as an unprecedented achievement, which Copts had been demanding for
decades. The law was, however, problematic in a number of ways, and sadly failed to address the
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key issue of sectarian tensions surrounding the construction of churches. More relevantly, the
law did not align with an endorsed overarching state rhetoric asserting its civil nature or the
equal citizenship of its Coptic citizens.
It entrenched religious difference in its treatment of Christians differently to their Muslim
counterparts, even if it eased the medieval Hamayuni law requirements, where the head of state
had to approve the construction of every new church. Criticizing the law, EIPR said in a
statement:
A special law to regulate the construction of churches already sends a discriminatory
message that the state distinguishes Christian citizens from Muslim citizens. While the
state permits the construction of mosques based on compliance with building codes and
subordination to the Ministry of Endowments, it imposes additional conditions on
churches.125
Indeed, under the new law, the governor, and not the president, approves churches, but it remains
discriminatory. It stipulated that approval for building a church is subject to security
considerations, and the need for a church, as determined by the number of Christian residents in
a specific area. Referring to the issuance of the law, then member of parliament Marguerite Azer
described it as a “big step forward towards the Civil State, which relies on establishing
citizenship.”126 Her statement stood in contrast to the reaction of activists, who decried the law
for the exact opposite. Discussions for a unified law for houses of worship had been abandoned
for a law regulating churches alone.
The process through which the law was formulated epitomizes the entrenchment of the role of
the Coptic Church as spokesman for all Copts. The negotiations over the text took place between
the Church and the government behind closed doors, with the House of Representatives, which
had unprecedented Christian representation, playing a minimal role.127
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Over almost five years of enforcement, the law had failed to stem violence against Christian
communities triggered by the construction of churches. During that time period 2016 - 2019,
EIPR documented a minimum of 36 cases of sectarian tension and violence surrounding church
construction. It also documented 25 cases of shuttering churches or stopping collective worship
during the same time frame. The continued closure of churches as an easy end to sectarian
tension is in violation of Article 8 of the Church Construction law, which stipulates that religious
services are not to be stopped in an existing church under any circumstances. Church
construction is a sensitive topic that touches the lives of Copts reminding them daily of their
status. The Copts of Faw Bahri in Qena, for example, have struggled to have a church for more
than 15 years, with attempts to build one met with unpunished violence and burning of Christian
houses. The law has failed to remedy their problem in its five years of operation. Faw Bahri is
one example among many, estimated to be in the hundreds.128
From the above, two points can be concluded. The overarching concepts of Civil State and
citizenship, are not guiding the process when tackling the most salient of Coptic issues. The
process better resembles bargaining for achieving whatever change is possible while remaining
within the same old frameworks. The new law, therefore, allowed for a continuation of the
restrictions to build churches, and contains enough loopholes to stop it altogether if the “security
situation” demands it. Additionally, from the perspective of the critique of secularism as
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, the issue with the law is not the state’s mandate to
regulate religious difference, but rather how it does so. Had the state regulated the construction
of all houses of worship indiscriminately, it would have had the opposite effect, of minimizing
religious difference.
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C. Personal Status Laws
At the heart of the Ottoman millet system was the autonomy granted to religious groups to
govern their own personal status affairs. It is also the only realm, where Shari'a continued to
apply after modernization and secularization post-independence. It has also been the Church’s
historical stronghold over Coptic lives outside church walls. There was a brief challenge to their
authority in the early twentieth century, when a progressive lay council took over the process.
However, the Church regained its control shortly after under Nasser, who empowered the Church
over the council.129 The Church’s supremacy was subsequently entrenched in article 3 of the
constitution, as previously discussed. Nonetheless, the issue of divorce and remarriage continued
to be a “headache” for the Church, as Copts continued to resort to the court system for the
application of Shari'a, or for challenging Church decisions. It additionally motivated many to
leave the Church altogether by conversion to escape the Church’s strict rules on divorce and
remarriage.
In 2010, the judicial system attempted to grant Christians the right to remarry, and approved
remarriage in defiance of the Church for two men. The two had been unable to remarry due to
the Church’s longstanding strict rules that upon divorce, only the victim spouse is granted
permission to remarry. And since all Egyptians cannot register a marriage in the absence of an
officiating ceremony by a priest or Maazoon, the Christians found at fault during their divorces
were forever denied the right to remarry. In light of the court decision, the Church openly said it
would defy it, and would hold on to its literal interpretation of the Bible on the matter.130 It is
perhaps one of the few instances, where lay Copts almost escaped the Church’s grip on personal
status matters. Since then, there had been no success. Calls for allowing civil marriage for Copts
have gone unheeded by government and Church alike for decades.
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The Church had since the 1960s attempted to reach an agreement with the government to resolve
conflicting rulings between its clerical councils and courts. However, the major Egyptian
denominations (Coptic Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant) have failed to reach agreement on a
unified personal status law, leaving many Copts stranded between the Church and court to
resolve their marriages or remarry.131 Serious discussions of the law would only start taking
place in 2014, upon the instruction of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi. During that time, the
Protestant Church had expressed its openness to the idea of instating civil marriage for Copts.
However, the opposition of the Coptic Orthodox Church would upend any hope of allowing civil
marriage in the new law. The delay in issuing the law however is not only a product of the
controversy around civil marriage, but also because a unified law means the three denominations
have to agree on common values to include in the law. As I write these lines, the discussions are
still ongoing.132
According to a draft that was made public in 2020, the law would stipulate that Copts have to
have gone through the Church’s dispute resolution councils prior to going to court. They also
would have no right to appeal church decisions before secular courts. The Church would also
have an exclusive right to grant second marriage permits. On the other hand, the draft legislation
expands the reasons for divorce.133 There had been historical progress on part of the Church
since 2016 in expanding the reasons for divorce and granting second marriage permissions. The
process was also streamlined, with more women represented on councils, which were multiplied
in number and provided with a process, where litigants can appeal decisions.134
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The journey of the reluctant law speaks volumes to the role of the Church. The Church is granted
authority over an integral part of Coptic Christians’ lives that is the right to marry. Giving it this
authority is the state. The state’s continuous acquiescence to the Church on the matter does not
emanate from its mandate to regulate religious difference, as part of a secular order, but rather
from a political alliance that serves its purposes. The continued governance of the Church of the
personal status of Christians epitomizes the anti-secular nature of the arrangement. It is the exact
opposite of the separation of Church and state. It is fundamentally the state relinquishing its
mandate to regulate personal status affairs to the Church. Coptic Christians have no choice but to
abide to the Church’s regulations, whether they are practicing or not, whether they agree with the
Church on the matter or not, or whether they are actually non-believers with a Christian status on
their IDs. The arrangement as it is has been a breeding ground for sectarian violence. It is also
what Mahmood focuses on as the ultimate facet of secularism in Egypt, which as explained
above, is flagrantly anti-secular.
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VII - Conclusion
As this paper has shown, it is not the secular regulation of religious difference that is the
producer of tensions, but rather the manner in which the state empowers religious institutions
and espouses Islam as its quintessential identity and Shari'a the basis of its public order. Despite
secularism’s inherent problems, and the dismissal of its derivatives, it continues to hold promise
for some change for Egypt’s minorities.
While the overarching secular order may produce some emphasis on religious difference, it is not
the main instigator of sectarian tension, it is rather the state that continues to foment strife by its
discriminatory policies. Those policies sometimes find roots in Egypt’s official interpretation of
Shari'a. An example of that is the refusal to merely recognize Baha’is, or the conversion of
Muslims to Christianity, due to that recognition’s conflict with Shari'a as the basis of public
order.135 That level of identification with religion, and with the religious institutions of Al-Azhar
and the Coptic Orthodox Church, is fundamentally anti-secular, and not a product of secularism
as posited by Mahmood.
Less identification, and easing of the grip of the Church and Azhar on personal status and
religious freedom issues, would bring forth much needed change. Real change, however, is
unlikely except in the context of a more comprehensive political reform that is beyond the Coptic
question, and one that is particularly elusive given the current complete closure of public space.
A gradual easing of the control of religious institutions over people’s personal status affairs
(which also happens to be at the heart of most sectarian tensions) would only happen if the
political regime ceases to rely on the legitimation of the religious institution. A workable shift
would take place within the same paradigm of The Established Religions category, as classified
by Cole Durham, while allowing civil recourse for adherents. Religious dissenters and minorities
would be recognized, not just unofficially tolerated, even if their right to practicing religious
rituals overtly continues to be restricted.
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